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Because the majority of critical infrastructure is now owned or operated by 
the private sector, governments have implemented schemes to facilitate the 
exchange of information between private sector owners and operators, to 
ensure that it is protected from terrorist attack. The operation of these 
information-sharing schemes has the potential to contravene the 
competition law provisions contained in Division 1 and Division 2 of Part 
IV of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (TPA). In light of these matters, 
this article considers whether there is a need for a specific statutory defence 
in the TPA in order to ensure that such arrangements can operate 
effectively and encourage the frank exchange of this type of information. 
The article examines the existing voluntary self-regulatory scheme adopted 
in Australia in 2003 and compares it with similar schemes in the United 
States where there is a move away from voluntary self-regulation towards a 
mandatory regulatory model with a specific legislated defence to shield 




A Threats to Critical Infrastructure 
Following the terrorist attacks in the United States of America on September 
11, 2001, and subsequent terrorist attacks in Bali (2002), Madrid (2004), 
London (2005), Mumbai (2008), and Jakarta (2009), there has been an 
increasing recognition by governments world-wide of the heightened 
importance of ensuring that adequate protection exists for critical 
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infrastructure. ‘Critical Infrastructure’ (CI) is defined by the Australian 
Government as:  
those physical facilities, supply chains, information technologies and 
communications networks which, if destroyed, degraded or rendered 
unavailable for an extended period, would adversely impact on the social or 
economic well-being of the nation or affect Australia’s ability to ensure 
national security.1
The enduring threat of terrorist attacks in Australia was acknowledged by the 
then Prime Minister as recently as August 2009, following the arrest of 
Somali extremists who were allegedly planning a terrorist attack on the 
Holsworthy army base in Sydney.
  
2 On 16 October 2009, the five extremists 
were convicted of terrorism offences. The judge found that that there was no 
evidence of any target having been selected; however, this did not mitigate the 
criminality of the terrorists in preparing for such an act. The terrorists had 
stockpiled 30 000 rounds of ammunition, bomb-making equipment and 
explosive chemicals with the intention of exacting revenge on Australia for its 
military presence in Iraq and Afghanistan.3
Digital infrastructure is especially vulnerable to attack. Cyber attacks are 
difficult to detect and even harder to defend against. The implications of a 
cyber attack via the internet could result in: the collapse of communications 
networks; the failure of electronic banking and major online shops including 
eBay and Amazon; the failure of transport networks, including air traffic 
control computers and railway systems; and the failure of the electricity grid, 
shutting down power supplies and causing widespread blackouts.
 
4 In the 
United States researchers have launched an experimental cyber attack which 
caused an electricity generator to self-destruct.5
                                                 
1 Attorney-General’s Department, Critical Infrastructure Protection (2009) <http://www.ag. 
gov.au/www/agd/agd.nsf/Page/Nationalsecurity_CriticalInfrastructureProtection>.  
 
2 Cameron Stewart and Milanda Rout, ‘Somali extremists on a “fatwa order” from God’: The 
Australian (Sydney) 5 August 2009, 4. 
3 James Madden and Angus Thompson, ‘Sydney Terror quintet facing life in jail for plotting 
murder on a massive scale’, The Australian (Sydney) 17 October 2009, 1; Sally Neighbour, 
‘Delusions of terror’, The Australian (Sydney), 20 October 2009, 13. 
4 ‘On the cyberwar’s frontline’, The Guardian Weekly (Haywards Heath, UK) 22 May 2009, 
25.  
5 Jeanne Meserve, Sources: Staged cyber attack reveals vulnerability in power grid (26 
September 2007) CNN International < http://edition.cnn.com/2007/US/09/26/power. 
at.risk/index.html> and Industrial Defender, Optimized to Assure Safety and Uptime (2010) 
<http://www.industrialdefender.com/compliance/index.php>. 
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The vulnerabilities of CI, and the growing capabilities and commitment of 
terrorists to inflict harm, are a continuing cause for concern on the part of 
government and private sector owners and operators of CI. Establishing an 
effective means of sharing of physical and cyber security information through 
the operation of CI information sharing schemes (‘CIISS’) has become an 
important component of effective CI and cyber-security risk management.  
B Responses to the Threat 
On 29 May 2009, President Obama presented the Cyberspace Policy Review6 
which reports on the changing direction of US cyber-security under the 
Obama administration. It states that cyber-security risks ‘... pose some of the 
most serious economic and national security challenges of the 21st century’.7
Australia is in the early stages of developing an information sharing network 
to combat terrorist attacks. The Trusted Information Sharing Network for 
Critical Infrastructure Protection (‘TISN’) was launched by the 
Commonwealth in 2003 to provide a secure forum for owners and operators 
of CI and government stakeholders to share information and discuss issues.  
 
The President has assumed responsibility for cyber-security. A national cyber-
security coordinator is to be appointed to oversee the task and report directly 
to the President.  
Participation in the TISN is voluntary. Information is disclosed at the 
discretion of each private participant, although they are required to sign a 
deed of confidentiality. It is unclear what sort of information is exchanged. 
Some guidance is provided by the cyber exercise program conducted by the 
Attorney-General’s Department, Security and Critical Infrastructure Division 
from 10-14 March 2008 (Cyber Storm II).8
The Cyber Storm II exercise involved four CI sectors – Water, Banking and 
Finance, Energy and Communications. According to the Final Report, the 
exercise ‘enabled robust information sharing, and encouraged private-public 
sector relationships and coordination across industries and between 
 The purpose of the program was 
to improve the ability of governments and CI owners and operators to manage 
and respond to incidents affecting national infrastructure.  
                                                 
6 White House, Cyberspace Policy Review (2009) <http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
assets/documents/Cyberspace_Policy_Review_final.pdf>. 
7 Ibid iii. 
8 See Attorney-General’s Department, Security and Critical Infrastructure Division, Cyber 
Storm II National Cyber Security Exercise Final Report (August 2008) 
<http://www.tisn.gov.au/www/tisn/rwpattach.nsf/VAP/(99292794923AE8E7CBABC6FB715
41EE1)~Cyber+Storm+II+final+report.pdf/$file/Cyber+Storm+II+final+report.pdf >. 
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competitors’.9 Participants enacted 12 simulated scenarios, including 
widespread internet degradation. Cyber Storm II allowed the participants to 
‘run an internal e-security exercise in conjunction with many of their suppliers 
and/or customers’.10
C Conflict with Existing Legal Regimes 
  
Any CIISS must take account of existing legal regimes. There are currently a 
number of legal and related issues that can impede effective information-
sharing arrangements pursuant to a CIISS.11
Information-sharing of the very kind for which a CIISS is established (that 
concerning security matters) may directly interfere with competition between 
participants. Obviously, much security information will deal with issues of 
competitor vulnerability and reliability – that is, information about known risk 
exposures and post-incident response planning to ensure that services will 
continue to be provided even under adverse circumstances. Where operators 
of CI compete with each other, the reliability of their services is one way in 
which competitive rivalry manifests itself. 
  
Exclusive possession of such security information gives a firm a competitive 
advantage over its rivals, in that its services will be more reliable than those of 
its rivals. If Bank A’s EFTPOS processing network becomes unreliable, its 
clients are likely to change to other banks. If Bank B possesses information 
which makes its service more reliable, then by sharing this information with 
Bank A, Bank B could forgo this competitive advantage.  
Given these disadvantages, governments need to ensure that adequate 
incentives exist for CI owners and operators to share information and that 
existing laws do not operate as an impediment to the sharing of such 
information.12
                                                 
9 Ibid 8. 
  
10 Ibid 7. 
11 See, for example, Bill Lane et al, ‘Freedom of information implications of information 
sharing networks for critical infrastructure protection’ (2008) 15(4) Australian Journal of 
Administrative Law 193.  
12 See Amitai Aviram and Avishalom Tor, Information Sharing in Critical Infrastructure 
Industries: Understanding the Behavioural and Economic Impediments (23 February 2004) 
Social Science Research Network <http://ssrn.com/abstract=427540>. See also John Han, 
‘Antitrust and Sharing Information about Product Quality’ (2006) 73 University of Chicago 
Law Review 995 and Amitai Aviram and Avishalom Tor, ‘Overcoming Impediments to 
Information Sharing’ (2004) 55 Alabama Law Review 231. 
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D Security Information and the Trade Practices Act 
This article seeks to examine the risk that sharing the kinds of information set 
out above or just ‘security information’ may breach Divisions 1 and 2 of Part 
IV of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (TPA).  
In the first part of the article we examine the information-sharing schemes that 
have been adopted in the United States and Australia for protecting CI and 
cyber-security. Next, we consider the risks and uncertainty surrounding the 
application of Divisions 1 and 2 of Part IV of the TPA to the existing TISN 
and any possible expansion of TISN-related activities. The central theme of 
this article is that this uncertainty should be eliminated since it has the 
capacity to inhibit effective participation in a CIISS by private sector 
participants. In the final part of the article we consider three mechanisms by 
which immunity could be conferred on private sector participants in CIISS 
activities.  
There is now broad agreement with the underlying policy against anti-
competitive practices enshrined in Part IV of the TPA. However, it is also 
recognised that in some circumstances protecting competition must give way 
to other social policy objectives. 
II PUBLIC/PRIVATE PERSPECTIVES, REGULATORY  
     APPROACHES AND TYPES OF INFORMATION SHARED 
CI protection and cyber-security involve two competing perspectives. On the 
one hand, governments bear responsibility for the maintenance of law and 
order and the protection of persons and property. Moreover, to the extent that 
the danger of terrorist attack emanates from or is linked to forces external to 
Australia, it is the responsibility of the Australian Federal government to 
protect its citizens from external threats to security. On the other hand, whilst 
governments and individuals alike rely heavily on CI for many essential 
services, up to 90 per cent of CI is actually privately owned.  
The different perspectives of business and government mean that each sector 
is likely to have a different conception of risk. While the owners and operators 
of CI have a sufficient incentive to protect their assets from terrorist attack, 
government reliance on CI means that it is likely to be relatively more risk-
averse and thus inclined to intervene to ensure that private owners and 
operators have adopted adequate standards and measures of protection. Even 
where the risk of a terrorist attack is perceived to be low, the consequences 
can be so severe that, from a public perspective, any level of risk is 
unacceptable. 
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Anderson and Fuloria make the argument for government regulatory 
intervention on the basis of ‘the large externalities of correlated failure’.13
A Models of CI Protection 
 
While a single-incident attack on an oil refinery could be accommodated by 
the oil company and its insurers, a multiple-incident attack on several oil 
refineries would cause a major disruption requiring government intervention. 
They draw an analogy with financial regulation: the isolated failure of a single 
bank may be of little consequence; but the risk of correlated failure imposes 
large externalities. 
There are a range of possible models for CI protection.14
Beyond this, as the Cyberspace Policy Review
 At one end of the 
spectrum, especially where CI assets are in government ownership, the 
government can directly mandate CI protection requirements by establishing 
its own cyber-security standards or at least delegating that responsibility to 
public regulatory agencies. At the other end of the spectrum, especially where 
CI is privately owned or controlled, regulation may be less direct or 
interventionist – involving, for example, various forms of voluntary self-
regulation.  
15
B Information Sharing  
 recognises, cyber-security is 
inevitably a shared responsibility, requiring a collaborative partnership to 
protect public and private interests. In other words, CI protection in most 
cases is likely to be a public-private partnership by government and the 
private sector owners of infrastructure, involving a system of information-
sharing and co-ordinated response. In fact, this is the approach taken in 
Australia – as explained earlier, the TISN was established by the Federal 
government in 2003 to provide a secure forum in which owners and operators 
of CI and government stakeholders can share information and discuss issues. 
Essentially, information-sharing arrangements for CI protection involve the 
exchange of information between CI owners or operators. This information is 
considered to be of mutual benefit in identifying and dealing effectively with 
                                                 
13 Ross Anderson and Shailendra Fuloria, Security economics and Critical National 
Infrastructure <http://weis09.infosecon.net/files/124/paper124.pdf>.  
14 Dan Assaf, ‘Models of critical information infrastructure protection’ 1 (2008) International 
Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection 6. See also Critical Infrastructure Protection 
Program, The CIP Report: Volume 6 Number 12 (June 2008) 
<http://cip.gmu.edu/archive/cip_report_6.12.pdf> which contains short descriptions of CIIP 
regimes in Israel, Sweden, United Kingdom, the European Union. 
15 White House, above n 6. 
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risks of attack or interference. Clearly, the viability of such arrangements is 
dependent on the confidentiality of exchanges. This confidentiality is 
necessary for obvious security reasons but also to ensure that participants are 
not inhibited from full and frank exchanges.  
This means, of course, that the ability to accurately identify or predict the 
exact nature and type of information likely to be shared in such an 
arrangement is very limited. Nevertheless, the general significance of private 
sector arrangements of this nature is obvious – in particular, their potential to 
operate in a realm unhindered by the possible reach of relevant TPA 
restrictions, especially those intended to regulate private sector business 
arrangements likely to result in anti-competitive practices.  
On that basis, it is important at least to postulate the types of information 
likely to be shared in order to properly analyse the consequences produced by 
information-sharing arrangements of this type for the scope and operation of 
the TPA and the balancing of competing interests. 
Accordingly and for the purposes of our analysis, we have postulated two 
broad categories of information likely to be shared if a CIISS is to be effective 
as a mechanism for identifying and dealing with security risks:  
Category 1: Pre-incident information exchange to prevent or 
minimise the risk of terrorist attack  
 
This category consists of: 
 
• Information to assist in identifying vulnerabilities; threat 
intelligence; information about existing security technologies 
and possible future technologies and best practices and risk 
management strategies. 
• Information to assist in preventing attacks, including 
interdependencies, inter-operability and compatibility of 
existing technologies and product characteristics which allow 
for coordination across industries and between competitors, 
supplier and/or customers. 
• ‘Incident information’ concerning existing attacks or attempts 
to disrupt infrastructure systems, whether the incident is 
cyber or physical. 
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Category 2: Post-incident response planning information 
exchange 
 
This category consists of: 
 
• Information and action plans designed to ensure business 
continuity, including information about production capacity, 
inventory stock levels and alternative supply arrangements 
involving potential allocations of scarce commodities, 
including both supplies for repair, and customer products to 
cover disabled or destroyed CI. 
The most serious risks of contravening Part IV of the TPA arise from the 
sharing of Category 2 information, especially information about production 
and inventory stock levels, future output plans, the rationing of available 
supplies, the sharing of spare parts to repair damaged CI following an attack 
and the allocation of products to existing customers.  
Moreover, following an attack in a particular region, private sector operators 
may stop competing with each other and instead agree to collectively focus 
their attention on supplying the affected region, particular customers or 
particular recovery projects in the region. They may also collectively agree to 
ration scarce supplies.  
The significance of this is that measures such as these are likely to satisfy the 
definition of a cartel provision in section 44ZZRD(3)(a)(iii) of the TPA. They 
are also likely to satisfy the definition of an exclusionary provision in section 
4D of the TPA, even though the main purpose is to restore the region to 
normality as quickly as possible. 
III INFORMATION-SHARING SCHEMES FOR CRITICAL  
       INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION: US AND AUSTRALIA  
       COMPARED 
As indicated earlier, the approach adopted by the governments of Australia 
and the United States is to protect their CI by facilitating the sharing of 
relevant information between CI operators on the one hand, and government 
on the other. These information-sharing schemes typically involve a 
combination of face-to-face meetings and electronic information exchange. In 
this Part we consider the approach adopted in the United States and then 
compare it with the approach adopted in Australia. 
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A United States of America 
The model adopted in the United States is one of industry sector, voluntary, 
self-regulation. The necessity for public-private collaboration and 
information-sharing to protect critical infrastructure was recognised as early 
as 1997 in the report of the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure. 
Presidential directive PD-63 issued by President Clinton in 1998 called for the 
creation of Information Sharing and Analysis Centres (ISACs) to protect the 
nation’s critical infrastructures by gathering, analysing, and disseminating 
information when appropriate.16
In response to the Directive, the financial services industry formed the FS-
ISAC (Financial Services Information Sharing and Analysis Centre) in 
1999.
 It was thought that this would foster 
voluntary self-regulation.  
17
Overall responsibility for initiating a critical infrastructure protection program 
in the United States, including information-sharing, has been assumed by the 
President, in conjunction with the Department of Homeland Security.
 This was followed in 2001, by the IT-ISAC (Information Technology 
Information Sharing and Analysis Centre), formed by 19 prominent IT 
companies. Each group uses a central repository to store and distribute 
information about security vulnerabilities and attacks, and members are 
expected to report information concerning their security problems or the 
solutions they have devised to such problems. 
18 The 
resulting Protected Critical Infrastructure Information Program is intended to 
be an information-sharing network between the private sector and government 
with capability to investigate and analyse vulnerabilities and risk assessments 
and discuss and implement greater CI protection.19
As part of the program, the Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory 




                                                 
16 Clinton Administration, The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Critical Infrastructure 
Protection: Presidential Decision Directive 63 (22 May 1998) Federation of American 
Scientists <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/paper598.htm>. 
 Representatives from all committees sit on the Advisory 
Council which aims to engage all participants and provide overall direction 
and guidance. There are 16 sector committees which have industry and 
17 Information about FS-ISAC can be obtained from its website at: Financial Services 
Information Sharing and Analysis Centre, Financial Services Information Sharing and 
Analysis Centre <http://www.fsisac.com>. 
18 6 USC §132 (2000). 
19 Homeland Security, Protected Critical Infrastructure Information Program (8 December 
2009) <http://www.dhs.gov/xinfoshare/programs/editorial_0404.shtm>. 
20 Ibid. 
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government members. These cover chemical and commercial facilities, 
communications, dams, defence, electricity, emergency services, financial 
services, food and agriculture, healthcare and public health, information 
technology, nuclear facilities, oil and natural gas, postal and shipping services, 
transportation and water. There are also State, Local, Tribal and Territorial 
government committees.21
The United States is moving away from the voluntary self-regulation model 
towards a mandatory regulatory model.
  
22 The Homeland Security 
Appropriations Act 2007 authorised the Department of Homeland Security to 
promulgate mandatory regulations, including cyber-security regulations, for 
securing high-risk chemicals.23
Similar mandatory cyber-security standards have been promulgated for the 
energy sector under the Energy Policy Act 2005 (US). The North-American 
Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) has developed cyber-security 
standards for the energy sector ISAC. These standards have received the 




The fear of intervention by competition regulators may operate as a 
disincentive to effective participation in a CIISS. In its 2003 report, a 
committee of the US National Research Council asserted that ‘[m]any 
companies fear that sharing [CI protection]-related data with competitors 




Information-sharing agreements run the risk of being unlawful under section 1 
of the Sherman Act, which prohibits all agreements in restraint of trade. 
Communications falling short of an agreement may constitute a ‘facilitating 
   
                                                 
21 Homeland Security, Council Members, Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council 
(3 June 2009) <http://www.dhs.gov/xprevprot/committees/editorial_0848.shtm>. Information 
about ISAC council is available from its website at: ISAC Council, About the Council 
<http://www.isaccouncil.org>. 
22 Dan Assaf, ‘Models of critical information infrastructure protection’ 1 (2008) International 
Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection 6. 
23 Homeland Security Appropriations Act 2007, Pub L No 109-295, § 550, 120 Stat 1355, 
1388.The chemical standards are available at: Industrial Defender, NERC CIP Compliance 
Solutions (2010) <http://www.industrialdefender.com/compliance/nerc_resources.php>. 
24 The NERC standards are available at: North American Electric Reliability Corporation, 
Reliability Standards (2010) <http://www.nerc.com/page.php?cid=2|20>.  
25 Stewart Personick and Cynthia Patterson (eds), Critical Information Infrastructure 
Protection and the Law: An Overview of Key Issues (The National Academies Press, 2003) 
30.  
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practice’.26 Facilitating practices may be prohibited by section 5 of the 
Federal Trade Commission Act which prohibits unfair methods of 
competition in or affecting commerce.27
According to one commentator, the hesitation on the part of businesses to 
report security intrusions stems from a number of factors, including fears of 
antitrust litigation: 
 A facilitating practice is condemned 
because it reduces uncertainty and has a tendency to increase the likelihood of 
tacit collusion. 
Industry has expressed concern that sharing information within a specific 
sector may prompt prosecution for violations of antitrust law. The 
Department of Justice has indicated that it will issue ‘business review 
letters’ to companies that are concerned about antitrust issues, offering 
assurances that it will not consider cybersecurity information sharing to be a 
violation of antitrust law. Industry representatives indicate that they find 
such assurances inadequate. Business review letters are not binding upon 
the Department of Justice. A change in the Executive Branch could bring a 
change in policy on this front. In order to avoid a stalemate that stymies 
national security progress, Congress needs to act quickly to provide 
assurance to private industry that information shared for purposes of 
protecting the economy and national security will not, in fact, constitute 
violation of the antitrust framework.28
It was the events of 9/11 which prompted Congress to specifically address 
perceived concerns that the antitrust laws could act as an impediment to an 
effective CIISS.  
 
                                                 
26 See Phillip Areeda, Antitrust Law, vol 6, (Little Brown, Boston, 1986) para 1407b, who 
defines a facilitating practice as ‘an activity that makes it easier for parties to coordinate price 
or other behaviour in an anticompetitive way’. See also Susan DeSanti and Ernest Nagata, 
‘Competitor Communications: Facilitating Practices or Invitations to Collude? An 
Application of Theories to Proposed Horizontal Agreements Submitted for Antitrust Review’ 
(1994-95) 63 Antitrust Law Journal 93 and Kevin Arquit, ‘The Boundaries of Horizontal 
Restraints: Facilitating Practices and Invitations to Collude’ (1992-3) 61 Antitrust Law 
Journal 531. 
27 See E I du Pont de Nemours & Co v FTC 729 F 2d 128 (2nd Cir, 1984) (The Ethyl Case). The 
Court of Appeals upheld the FTC’s authority to proscribe unilateral conduct in an 
oligopolistic industry as ‘unfair’ under s 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, but rejected 
the conclusion that the use of advance notice of price increases was likely to facilitate 
collusion. See George Hay, ‘Facilitating Practices: The Ethyl Case (1984)’, in John Kwoka 
and Lawrence White (eds), The Antitrust Revolution: Economics, Competition, and Policy 
(Oxford University Press, 3rd ed, 1999) 182. 
28 Emily Frye, ‘The Tragedy of the Cyber-commons: Overcoming Fundamental Vulnerabilities 
to Critical Infrastructures in a Networked World’ (2002) 58 Business Lawyer 349, 374–5. 
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1 Antitrust Exemption 
On 24 September 2001 the Bennett-Kyl Bill, S 1456, 107th Congress, was 
introduced into the Senate and referred to the Senate Committee on 
Governmental Affairs. Hearings were held on 8 May 2002, chaired by Senator 
Joseph Lieberman.29
I am not an expert ... on antitrust law … but I have many years of practical 
experience in this industry. Based on that experience, I understand that 
company executives and managers believe they cannot prudently discuss 
certain matters with their competitors, suppliers, or customers. They believe 
that such discussions, and especially any resulting plans or actions, could be 
the source of antitrust litigation. In addition, even if a company might 
ultimately prevail, the great expense, potential risk of adverse publicity or 
even temporary loss, and possible public release of sensitive information 
during the course of such litigation lead them to not even begin the 
conversation in the first place. That diminishes our ability to improve our 
security in advance of a problem. 
 In his testimony before the Senate Committee, Michehl 
R Gent, the President and Chief Executive Officer of the North American 
Electric Reliability Council stated: 
These concerns go beyond the potential antitrust problems caused by merely 
sharing information about threats. In particular, entire industries are now 
having to address whether and how to share spare parts or other resources to 
repair major widespread damage and prevent worse calamities due to 
cascading failures. The issue of sharing also involves potential allocations 
of scarce commodities – both supplies for repair, and products for 
customers. Further, entire industries may determine security-related 
requirements to ask of their suppliers and business partners. At the least, 
entire industries may discuss the security-related short comings of existing 
products, suppliers and partners. Each of these actions is ripe for allegations 
of illegal market manipulation (boycotts, market allocations, etc).30
The purpose of the Bennett-Kyl Bill – S 1456, was to overcome these 
concerns and to encourage private entities to share information related to CI 
with the federal government. In that respect it contained an explicit antitrust 
exemption designed to facilitate such sharing. Clause 7 of the bill provided: 
 
(a) Antitrust Exemption – Except as provided in subsection (b), 
the antitrust laws shall not apply to conduct engaged in by an 
Information Sharing and analysis Organization or its members, 
                                                 
29 Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, Securing Our Infrastructure: 
Private/Public Information Sharing (8 May 2002) <http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107_senate_hearings&docid=f:80597.pdf >. 
30 Ibid 91–2. See also the testimony of Harris N Miller, President of the Information 
Technology Association of America, at 102. 
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including making and implementing an agreement, solely for the 
purposes of – 
(1) gathering and analysing critical infrastructure information 
in order to better understand security problems related to 
critical infrastructure and protected systems, and 
interdependencies of critical infrastructure and protected 
systems, in order to ensure the availability, integrity, and 
reliability of critical infrastructure and protected systems; 
(2) communicating or disclosing critical infrastructure 
information to help prevent, detect, mitigate, or recover 
from the effects of a problem related to critical 
infrastructure or protected systems; or 
(3) voluntarily disseminating critical infrastructure 
information to its members, other Information sharing and 
Analysis Organizations, State, local, or Federal 
Governments, or any entities that may be of assistance in 
carrying out the purposes specified in paragraphs (1) and 
(2). 
(b) Exception – Subsection (a) shall not apply with respect to 
conduct that involves or results in an agreement to boycott any 
person, to allocate a market, or to fix prices or output. 
 
However, this specific exemption was not adopted in the Critical 
Infrastructure Information Act, 2002 (US) (CII Act)31 as part of the Homeland 
Security Act 2002 (US). Rather, the CII Act provided for an indirect antitrust 
exemption via the Defense Production Act of 1950 (DPA).32 Pursuant to the 
DPA, Congress has given the President limited authority to shield agreements 
from antitrust laws.33
                                                 
31 Codified in 6 USC § §131-134 (2000). 
 The authority may only be used upon a finding of 
conditions that directly threaten the national defence or preparedness 
programs.  
32 6 USC §133(h) provides: ‘The President may delegate authority to a critical infrastructure 
protection program, designated under section 132 of this title, to enter into a voluntary 
agreement to promote critical infrastructure security, including with any Information Sharing 
and Analysis Organization, or a plan of action as otherwise defined in section 2158 of title 50, 
Appendix.’ 
33 50 USC Appendix – War and National Defense § 2158. See Kristen Elizabeth Uhl, ‘The 
Freedom of Information Act Post-9/11: Balancing the Public’s Right to Know, Critical 
Infrastructure Protection, and Homeland Security’ (2004) 53 American University Law 
Review 261, 278. 
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Paragraph 2158 (j) of Title 50, Appendix – War and National Defence 
provides: 
(1) In General 
Subject to paragraph (4), there shall be available a defence for 
any person to any civil or criminal action brought under the 
antitrust laws (or any similar law of any State) with respect to 
any action taken to develop or carry out any voluntary 
agreement or plan of action under this section that –  
(A) such action was taken –  
(i) in the course of developing a voluntary agreement 
initiated by the President or a plan of action adopted 
under any such agreement; or 
(ii) to carry out a voluntary agreement initiated by the 
President and approved in accordance with this section 
or a plan of action adopted under any such agreement, 
and 
(B) such person – 
(i) complied with the requirements of this section and 
any regulation prescribed under this section; and 
(ii) acted in accordance with the terms of the voluntary 
agreement or plan of action. 
… 
(4) Exception for Actions Taken to Violate the Antitrust 
Laws 
The defence established in paragraph (1) shall not be 
available if the person against whom it is asserted shows 
that the action was taken for the purpose of violating the 
antitrust laws. 
 
The United States approach of relying on a specific legislated defence for the 
exchange of CI information clearly indicates that antitrust laws were viewed 
as an impediment to the operation of a CIISS. At the same time, the process 
was designed to ensure that the antitrust defence provided by the DPA was 
not abused. In this respect the defence is not available if the plaintiff is able to 
establish that the conduct at issue was a deliberate attempt to violate antitrust 
law.  
B Australia: Trusted Information Sharing Network 
In Australia, the Trusted Information Sharing Network for Critical 
Infrastructure Protection (‘TISN’) was launched by the Commonwealth in 
2003 to provide a secure forum for owners and operators of CI and 
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government stakeholders to share information and discuss issues. The TISN 
resulted from a recommendation of the Business-Government Task Force on 
Critical Infrastructure which met throughout 2002. 
The model adopted in Australia is very similar to the US model and relies on 
voluntary, industry self-regulation with little government intervention. 
The information-sharing approach to CI protection aims to identify CI, 
analyse vulnerabilities, risks and sector interdependencies and prepare for 
‘hazards’.34 The scheme requires active participation by owners and operators 
of CI in Australia. Given the inter-dependent nature of CI, effective protection 
is impossible without cooperation and coordination.35
The type of information envisaged to be shared includes: 
 
• identification of ‘critical’ infrastructure; 
• information regarding vulnerabilities of infrastructure; 
• current risk management strategies; 
• expected hazards including terrorism, cyber-attack, natural disaster etc; 
• likely effects of different hazards; 
• inter-dependencies of sectors and flow-on effects of attacks.36
By December 2007, nine Infrastructure Assurance Advisory Groups 
(‘IAAGs’) – the Australian equivalent of the ISACs – had been formed within 
the TISN scheme: Transport, Energy, Emergency Services, Banking and 
Finance, Health, Food Chain, Mass Public Gatherings, Water Services and 
Communications. Each IAAG is a closed community and comprises industry 
bodies such as councils and boards, industry participants who own, operate or 
use the specific critical infrastructure and relevant government departments. It 
is a closed community because it is dealing with sensitive and confidential 
information. 
 
It seems that the information disclosed by the participants in the TISN falls 
into Category 1 and that the TISN has not yet evolved to deal with Category 2 
information. 
The Attorney-General’s Department has established processes and procedures 
that must be followed when meetings are held. Each private sector participant 
                                                 
34 Trusted Information Sharing Network, About Critical Infrastructure Protection 
<http://www.tisn.gov.au/www/tisn/tisn.nsf/Page/About_Critical_Infrastructure>. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Trusted Information Sharing Network, Owners and Operators of Critical Infrastructure 
<http://www.tisn.gov.au/www/tisn/tisn.nsf/Page/Stakeholders_Ownersandoperatorsofcriticali
nfrastructure>. 
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in the TISN must sign a Deed of Confidentiality which ‘is intended to 
facilitate information sharing within the TISN and assist companies to meet 
their existing legal obligations’.37
Members of each IAAG have access to the TISN website for their particular 
group which allows each member to know who the other members of the 
IAAG are and to exchange telephone numbers. Thus, for example, if the 
representative of a telecommunications company within the Communications 
IAAG becomes aware of some kind of cyber attack on the company, he or she 
can check with other members to see if they are experiencing the same or a 
similar sort of problem. The arrangements are quite informal and allow for a 
rapid response in relation to a perceived or actual threat. 
  
The Critical Infrastructure Advisory Committee (CIAC) consisting of a 
representative of each IAAG co-ordinates communication between the sectors 
represented in the TISN and acts as a link with the Attorney-General who, in 
turn, is able to pass on any concerns to the Cabinet. 
In relation to the risk of cyber attacks, the Australian Government Computer 
Emergency Readiness Team (GovCERT.au) was established in 2005 to assist 
in the formulation of e-security policy and to liaise with foreign government 
Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs).38
IV APPLICATION OF THE TPA TO TISN INFORMATION  
       SHARING AND RELATED ACTIVITIES  
 
In the same manner as their US counterparts, Australian private owners and 
operators of CI participating in the TISN scheme have raised concerns about 
the risk of contravening the TPA.39
At one stage, the Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department considered 
seeking authorisation for the TISN scheme from the Australian Competition 
 Accordingly, in this Part we examine first 
the way in which the new law might apply to TISN activities, and, secondly, 
the manner in which the new measures referred to earlier are likely to give 
rise to more serious concerns on the part of private sector owners and 
operators regarding the possible breaching of the TPA. 
                                                 
37 Trusted Information Sharing Network, CIP Newsletter: Volume 4 Number 3 – Legal Issues 
(October 2007) [6] <http://www.ag.gov.au/agd/WWW/rwpattach.nsf/VAP/(930C 
12A9101F61D43493D44C70E84EAA)~Legal+issues+final+final.pdf/$file/Legal+issues+fina
l+final.pdf>. 
38 Australian Government Attorney-General’s Department, GovCERT.au (24 November 2009) 
<http://www.ag.gov.au/govcert>. 
39 Trusted Information Sharing Network, above n 37, 4. 
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and Consumer Commission (ACCC).40 Instead however, a discussion paper 
has been prepared which has been publicly endorsed by the Chairman of the 
ACCC.41
The most serious potential anti-competitive consequence of a CIISS could 
arise from Category 2 arrangements between horizontal competitors giving 
rise to an exclusionary provision. 
  
A Application of Part IV, Division 1 of the TPA 
The criminalisation of cartel conduct, provided for in the Trade Practices 
Amendment (Cartel Conduct and Other Measures) Act 2009 (Cth) (CC & OM 
Act), which took effect on 24 July 2009, could operate in such a way as to 
constitute an impediment to the exchange of information that is necessary to 
protect CI from terrorist attack.  
Division 1 contains two sets of prohibitions: 
• The cartel offences under sections 44ZZRF and 4ZZRG; and  
• The civil per se prohibitions under sections 44ZZRJ and 44ZZRK. 
1 Cartel Offences 
The main cartel offence is created by section 44ZZRF which provides: 
(1) A corporation commits an offence if: 
(a) the corporation makes a contract or arrangement, or arrives at an 
understanding; and 
(b) the contract, arrangement or understanding contains a cartel 
provision. 
(2) The fault element for paragraph (1)(b) is knowledge or belief. 
Section 44ZZRG separately prohibits giving effect to a cartel provision in a 
contract, arrangement or understanding. The fault element is again knowledge 
or belief. 
 
                                                 
40 Attorney-General’s Department, Information Sharing Arrangements <http://www.ag.gov. 
au/agd/WWW/rwpattach.nsf/VAP/(930C12A9101F61D43493D44C70E84EAA)~info+sharin
g+presentation.ppt/$file/info+sharing+presentation.ppt>. 
41 Trusted Information Sharing Network, above n 37, 4.  
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The criminal offence in section 44ZZRF(1) comprises two physical elements:  
• first, that the corporation makes a contract or arrangement or arrives 
at an understanding; and  
• secondly, that the contract, arrangement or understanding contains a 
cartel provision.  
In relation to the first physical element — the act of ‘making a contract or 
arrangement, or arriving at an understanding’ — there is no specified fault 
element. The default fault element is ‘intention’.42 For the purposes of the 
Criminal Code a person has the requisite ‘intention’ if ‘... he or she means to 
engage in that conduct’.43
In relation to the second physical element – the requirement that a contract, 
arrangement or understanding contain a cartel provision – the fault element 
specified in section 44ZZRF(2) is ‘knowledge or belief’. Thus, in relation to 
the criminal offence in section 44ZZRF(1), it will be necessary to prove that 
an individual or corporation intended to enter into a contract, arrangement or 
understanding and that they knew or believed that the contract, arrangement 
or understanding contained a cartel provision. 
  
The prosecution does not need to prove that the accused knew that the 
provision satisfied the definition of a cartel provision in section 44ZZRD, or 
that a cartel offence under section 44ZZRF(1) of making a contract 
arrangement or understanding containing a cartel provision has been 
committed.44 It is only necessary for the accused to know that a provision 
‘possess[es] the qualities’ that, by virtue of section 44ZZRD, go to make the 
provision a cartel provision, ‘... regardless of whether the accused appreciates 
the legal significance of those qualities’.45 What is required is an awareness of 
the nature of the conduct defined in section 44ZZRD and prohibited in section 
44ZZRF. A person has the requisite ‘knowledge’ of a circumstance or result if 
‘... he or she is aware that it exists or will exist in the ordinary course of 
events’.46
The TPA does not provide guidance as to whether cartel conduct should be 
pursued civilly or criminally. The matter is to be left to the ACCC in 
 No additional element of dishonesty is required. 
                                                 
42 Explanatory Memorandum [2.30]. Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) s 5.6 applies since creating 
a contract, arrangement or understanding is a form of conduct. 
43 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) s 5.2(1). 
44 See R v Tang (2008) 237 CLR 1 (Tang Case) and Alex Steel, ‘What’s to Know? The 
Proposed Cartel Offence’ (2009) 32(1) University of New South Wales Law Journal 216. 
45 Tang Case (2008) 237 CLR 1 [48].  
46 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) s 5.3. 
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consultation with the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions 
(CDPP). There are a number of differences between the cartel offence and the 
civil prohibition. In prosecuting the cartel offence it would be necessary for 
the CDPP to: 
• establish the elements of each offence, including the fault element 
provided for in the Criminal Code; 
• prove the offence beyond reasonable doubt; and  
• obtain a unanimous verdict of the jury. 
2 Civil Prohibitions 
The new civil prohibitions in sections 44ZZRJ and 44ZZRK are in identical 
terms to the offences, except that they omit sub-section (2) relating to the fault 
elements. 
The civil prohibitions require proof of three elements: 
• a contract, arrangement or understanding; 
• a cartel provision; and  
• satisfaction by at least two of the parties to the contract, arrangement 
or understanding of the competition condition. 
The first element – a contract arrangement or understanding – is considered 
below in relation to section 45(2) of the TPA. 
As regards the second element, the concept of a cartel provision is central to 
both the criminal offences and the civil prohibitions in Part IV Division 1 and 
is defined separately for each. In order to satisfy the definition of a cartel 
provision in section 44ZZRD it is first necessary to establish that the 
provision at issue falls within one of the four different types of cartel 
provision in section 44ZZRD relating to –  
• price fixing: section 44ZZRD(2); 
• output restriction in the production or supply chain: section 
44ZZRD(3)(a); 
• market allocation (customers, suppliers or geographical areas): 
section 44ZZRD(3)(b); or  
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• bid-rigging: section 44ZZRD(3)(c). 
The definitions are far-reaching. This is particularly so in relation to output 
restriction. Section 44ZZRD(3)(a) provides that a provision in a contract, 
arrangement or understanding is an output restriction provision if: 
… the provision has the purpose, of directly or indirectly: 
(a) preventing, restricting or limiting: 
(i) the production, or likely production, of goods by any or all of the 
parties to the contract, arrangement or understanding; or 
(ii) the capacity, or likely capacity, of any or all of the parties to the 
contract, arrangement or understanding; or 
(iii) the supply, of likely supply, of goods or services to persons or 
classes of persons by any or all of the parties to the contract, 
arrangement or understanding. 
Section 44ZZRD(3)(a) prohibits provisions that have a direct or indirect 
purpose of reducing production, capacity or supply. It is not necessary to 
prove whether such reduction actually occurs or is likely to occur, and the 
extent of the reduction is likewise irrelevant. 
The application of this definition of a cartel provision to a post-incident 
response-planning information-exchange arrangement is readily apparent. 
Consider the following examples.  
Assume an attack on a number of electricity sub-stations that supply Sydney 
with much of its electricity. There are back-up supplies of diesel fuel to 
operate generators so that apartment dwellers can continue to live in their 
apartments until power is restored. An arrangement is entered into between 
fuel suppliers to ensure that back-up supplies of diesel fuel are rationed to 
ensure that the maximum number of apartment dwellers benefit. The purpose 
of the rationing provision is to restrict the supply of fuel to other users of 
diesel fuel such as motorists. The arrangement would be likely to fall within 
the definition of a cartel provision in section 44ZZRD(3)(a)(iii) despite the 
obvious public benefit of such a provision. 
Assume that after the attack it is decided that private contractors will re-build 
the electricity sub-stations. The re-construction program contains a provision 
that requires the repair or rebuilding of the sub-stations to be given priority 
over less critical structures or facilities such as private dwellings. The 
subjective purpose of the parties is to allocate suppliers to certain tasks in 
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priority to other tasks. Such a provision is also likely to fall within the 
definition of a cartel provision in section 44ZZRD(3)(a)(iii). 
As regards, the third element, section 44ZZRD(4) provides: 
The competition condition is satisfied if at least 2 of the parties to the 
contract, arrangement or understanding: 
(a) are or are likely to be, or  
(b) but for any contract, arrangement or understanding, would be or be 
likely to be; 
in competition with each other in relation to: 
… 
(d) if paragraph (2)(d) … applies in relation to an acquisition, or likely 
acquisition, of goods or services – the acquisition of those goods or services 
… 
The final four words (‘those goods or services’) mean that at least two of the 
parties to the relevant contract, arrangement or understanding must be actual 
or potential competitors in relation to the goods or services that are the subject 
of the cartel provision, that is, the goods or services that are being acquired 
pursuant to the joint procurement collaboration. 
3 Penalties for Contravening Cartel Offences and Civil  
      Prohibitions 
Both corporations and individuals can be made liable on two different bases. 
Primary liability attaches to corporations based on the conduct of an 
individual engaged in on behalf of the corporation.47
In relation to cartel offences the penalties that can be imposed are: 
 Where a corporation is 
primarily liable for a cartel offence or a civil prohibition, an employee, 
servant or agent of the corporation may be liable as an accessory based on 
aiding, abetting, inducing, or being knowingly concerned in the offence or 
civil prohibition. 
• for corporations, on conviction, a maximum fine that is the same as 
that for a civil contravention;48
                                                 
47 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 84(2). 
 
48 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) ss 44ZZRF(3) and 44ZZRG(3). 
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• for individuals, on conviction, a maximum fine of $220 000 and/or a 
maximum gaol term of 10 years.49
The penalties that can be imposed for breaches of the civil prohibitions are:   
  
• for corporations, a maximum pecuniary penalty which is the greatest 
of $10 million, or three times the gain or 10 per cent of the annual 
turnover.50
• for individuals a maximum pecuniary penalty of $500 000.
 
51
Given that the objective of the CC & OM Act is to strengthen deterrence, it is 
likely that the level of pecuniary penalties and fines imposed will increase 
under the new regime, and it is likely that the courts will impose custodial 
sentences in relation to cartel offences.  
  
4 Authorisation o f  Cart el Of f ences and  Civ il  
   Proh ib it ions 
Section 88 provides that the ACCC may authorise conduct that would 
otherwise breach the prohibitions in Part IV. Section 88(1A) provides that the 
ACCC may authorise a corporation to make a contract, arrangement or 
understanding, or give effect to a contract, arrangement or understanding that 
contains a cartel provision. The tests to be applied in determining whether to 
give such an authorisation are set out in sections 90(5A) and (5B) 
Section 44ZZRM provides that the cartel offences, sections 44RF and 44RJ, 
do not apply in relation to the making of a contract that contains a cartel 
provision if the contract is subject to a condition that the provision will not 
come into force unless and until the corporation is granted an authorisation, 
and the corporation applies for an authorisation within 14 days after the 
contract is made.  
There are likely to be a number of provisions in contracts, arrangements and 
understandings that satisfy the definition of a cartel provision, but do not 
benefit from one of the exceptions. In that event the parties will be forced to 
seek authorisation from the ACCC. 
                                                 
49 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) ss 44ZZRF(4) and 44ZZRG(4). 
50 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 76(1A). 
51 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 70(1)(e). 
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Section 177 provides that if an authorisation was granted prior to 24 July 2009 
in relation to a cartel provision, the authorisation continues to apply in relation 
to the cartel provision. 
B Application of Part IV, Division 2 of TPA 
There is considerable scope for overlap between the cartel offences and civil 
prohibitions in Division 1 of Part IV, and the pre-existing prohibitions in 
section 45(2) of the TPA. 
If a provision does not satisfy the definition of a ‘cartel provision’ in section 
44ZZRD, it may satisfy the definition of an exclusionary provision in section 
4D or be a provision that has the purpose, effect or likely effect of 
substantially lessening competition. In that case it would be prohibited by 
section 45(2). 
Section 45(2) is the substantive prohibition which is of most relevance to a 
CIISS. It provides: 
 (2) A corporation shall not – 
 (a) make a contract or arrangement, or arrive at an understanding, if – 
(i) the proposed contract, arrangement or understanding 
contains an exclusionary provision; or 
(ii) a provision of the proposed contract, arrangement or 
understanding has the purpose, or would have or be likely to 
have the effect, of substantially lessening competition; or 
(b) give effect to a provision of a contract, arrangement or 
understanding, … if that provision – 
(i) is an exclusionary provision; or 
(ii) has the purpose, or has or is likely to have the effect, 
of substantially lessening competition. 
Section 45(2) contains one per se prohibition in relation to contracts, 
arrangements or understandings that contain an exclusionary provision under 
section 45(2)(a) or (b)(i). 
Section 45(2)(a) or (b)(ii) prohibits contracts, arrangements or understandings 
that contain a provision that has: 
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• the purpose of substantially lessening competition; or 
• the effect of substantially lessening competition; or 
• the likely effect of substantially lessening competition. 
The prohibition in section 45(2) is not limited in its application to horizontal 
contracts, arrangements and understandings. It can also apply to vertical 
contracts that do not meet the definition of ‘exclusive dealing’ in section 47 of 
the TPA. This means that information-sharing between CIs operating at 
different functional levels of the market may also be caught.  
Furthermore, the prohibition in section 45(2) does not require that the 
agreement be between competitors. This is only a requirement for per se 
prohibitions, namely the prohibition against exclusionary provisions as 
defined in section 4D of the TPA. 
Sub-paragraph 45(2)(b) prohibits ‘giving effect to’52
In other words, contracts, arrangements and understandings containing 
provisions which are ‘exclusionary provisions’ are prohibited per se, but 
otherwise will fall within section 45(2) only if they have the purpose or likely 
effect of substantially lessening competition. An ‘exclusionary provision’ is 
defined in section 4D of the TPA but for present purposes is it sufficient to 
note that it must: 
 provisions of contracts, 
arrangements or understandings which are exclusionary provisions or have the 
purpose or likely effect of substantially lessening competition. 
• be a provision of a contract, arrangement or understanding made (or 
proposed) between at least two competitors,53 or persons who would 
be likely to be competitors if not for the exclusionary provision;54
• have the purpose of preventing, restricting or limiting the supply or 
acquisition of goods or services to or from particular persons or 
classes of persons, by any or all parties to the contract.
 and 
55
1 Exclusionary Provisions  
 
Exclusionary provisions are likely to be found not just in arrangements which 
are clearly anti-competitive, such as those involving market allocation, but 
                                                 
52 ‘Give effect to’, in this context, includes doing an act or thing in pursuance of or in 
accordance with or enforcing or purporting to enforce: Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 4. 
53 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 4D(1)(a). 
54 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 4D(2). 
55 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 4D(1)(b). 
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also output restriction of a kind already considered in relation to the definition 
in section 44ZZRD(3)(a). 
In the context of a CIISS, exclusionary provisions may arise from: 
• agreements among competitors to allocate or ration supplies of spare 
parts for the repair of damaged CI; 
• agreements among competitors to allocate scarce products among 
existing customers following an attack; and 
• agreements among competitors to purchase only products that meet 
certain minimum security-related standards. 
The wide-reaching effect of section 45(2) is illustrated by cases such as Rural 
Press Ltd v ACCC,56
However, this was rejected by Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ
 where an assurance given by a competitor that it would 
withdraw from a particular market was held to constitute a market sharing 
arrangement, even though it was extracted by threats. Counsel for Rural Press 
argued that it would be too ‘draconian’ to treat the market sharing 
arrangement at issue in that case as an exclusionary provision subject to per se 
treatment.  
57 with whom 
Kirby J agreed.58
2 Contract, Arrangement or Understanding 
 Their Honours referred to the fact that market sharing 
arrangements are per se violations of the Sherman Act 1890 (US).  
Of course, not all collusive conduct is caught by section 45(2). It must be 
conduct pursuant to a ‘contract, arrangement or understanding’. These terms 
are not defined in the TPA.  
‘Contract’, in this context, has its ordinary common law meaning, ie, a 
transaction based on consensus which is enforceable at law.59
                                                 
56 Rural Press Ltd v ACCC (2003) 216 CLR 53. 
 By comparison, 
the words ‘arrangement’ and ‘understanding’ are intended to catch 
57 Ibid 87-8. Their Honours referred to the fact that market sharing arrangements are per se 
violations of s 1 of the Sherman Act 1890 (US). 
58 Ibid 98. See also Visy Paper Pty Ltd v ACCC (2003) 216 CLR 1, 13 (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, 
Gummow and Hayne JJ). 
59 Hughes v Western Australian Cricket Association Inc (1986) 19 FCR 10, 32. 
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transactions or dealings which are informal and may not give rise to a legally 
binding contract.60
Nonetheless, the arrangement or understanding, however informal, must 
evidence a consensus as to what is to be done reflecting some level of 
commitment, rather than a mere hope or expectation that the other party will 
behave in a certain way.  
  
In the CC (NSW) case, Lindgren J summarised the current position: 
A mere expectation that as a matter of fact a party will act in a certain way 
is not enough, even if it has been engendered by that party. In the present 
case, for example, each individual who attended the Meeting may have 
expected that as a matter of fact the others would return to their respective 
offices by car, or, to express the matter differently, each may have been 
expected by the others to have acted in that way. Each may even have 
“aroused” that expectation by things he said at the Meeting. But these 
factual expectations do not found an “understanding” in the sense in which 
the word is used in ss 45 and 45A. The conjunction of the “understanding” 
with the words “agreement” and “arrangement” and the nature of the 
provisions show that something more is required.61
Lindgren J stated further: ‘The cases require that at least one party “assume an 
obligation” or give an “assurance” or “undertaking” that it will act in a certain 
way’.
 
62 An understanding will usually, but not necessarily, involve some 
reciprocity of obligation.63
Only limited information about the operation of the Commonwealth’s TISN is 
in the public domain. A fact sheet published by the Commonwealth Attorney-
General’s Department states: 
 
Participation in the TISN is voluntary and any information participants 
share is done so (sic) at their discretion. The [confidentiality] Deed 
specifically provides that there is no obligation on participants to disclose 
any information if they do not wish to do so.64
                                                 
60 Trade Practices Commission v David Jones (Australia) Pty Ltd (1986) 13 FCR 446, ACCC v 
Leahy Petroleum Pty Ltd (2004) 141 FCR 183, 54. 
 
61 ACCC v CC (NSW) Pty Ltd (1999) 92 FCR 375, 408. 
62 Ibid. 
63 ACCC v Leahy Petroleum Ltd (2004) 141 FCR 183, [54] (Merkel J).  
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This appears to rule out the existence of a legal obligation upon TISN 
participants to share any relevant information. Nonetheless, participants may 
feel morally bound to share such information with the TISN as good and 
responsible corporate citizens, acting in the interests of the national security. 
To the extent that there is some objective evidence of a mutually felt 
obligation of this nature, this may amount to a sufficient level of 
‘commitment’ to constitute an arrangement or understanding for the purposes 
of section 45(2) of the TPA.65
Moreover, an arrangement or understanding of the kind envisaged by section 
45(2) of the TPA would also be possible, even though there was evidence that 
one or more TISN participants did not freely participate in the sharing of the 
relevant information in the sense that their participation was in some degree 
coerced or the result of outside pressure.  
 
For instance, if it could be established that a TISN participant ‘volunteered’ 
information based on the belief that, if it did not do so, the Commonwealth 
would legislate to compel disclosure, this may be sufficient to constitute an 
arrangement for the purposes of section 45(2).66 On the other hand, a mere 
hope or expectation that others will share information would not be 
sufficient.67
For example, in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Leahy 
Petroleum Pty Ltd,
 
68 the evidence established that petrol stations had been 
telephoning each other to give advance notice of proposed price changes, and 
inquiring whether the other party would follow suit.69
                                                 
65 See generally Top Performance Motors Pty Ltd v Ira Berk (Qld) Pty Ltd (1975) 5 ALR 465, 
469–70. 
 However, a 
contravention of section 45(2) was not established. This was because there 
was no evidence that the parties to the alleged arrangement or understanding 
felt bound to follow the suggested price changes. Although there was 
evidence that in many cases the price changes were followed, there was also 
evidence that, in many cases, the proposed changes were not followed. 
66 See, eg, Rural Press Ltd v ACCC (2003) 216 CLR 53.  
67 Stationers Supply Pty Ltd v Victorian Authorised Newsagents Association Ltd (1993) 44 FCR 
35, 61, approved by the Full Court in News Ltd v Australian Rugby Football League Limited 
(1996) 64 FCR 410, 571-2. 
68 ACCC v Leahy Petroleum Pty Ltd (2007) 160 FCR 321.  
69 See, eg, ACCC v Leahy Petroleum Pty Ltd (2007) 160 FCR 321, 931. See Ian Tonking, 
‘Belling the CAU: Finding a Substitute for “Understandings” about Price’ (2008) 16(1) 
Competition and Consumer Law Journal 46 and Ian Wylie, ‘Understanding Understandings 
under the Trade Practices Act – An Enforcement Abyss’ (2008) 16 Trade Practices Law 
Journal 20. 
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This indicates that it would be difficult to establish a contravention of section 
45(2) in a CIISS environment. Even if it could be established that competitors 
in a CIISS environment were sharing information about relevant matters, it 
would not necessarily follow that a contravention of section 45(2) had 
occurred. In particular, there would need to be evidence of 1) a consensus or 
meeting of minds or some level of commitment by at least one of the 
participants in the CIISS as to how to implement a recovery plan after an 
attack on CI, and 2) which participant will be responsible for supplying 
particular geographical locations or particular customers. 
3 Information-Sharing: Likely Effect of Substantially  
      Lessening Competition 
Information-sharing may be essential to enable competitors to share a 
common CI facility such as a transport network (airlines sharing a common 
airport, trains sharing the same rail track), or an energy network (power 
generators sharing the same electricity grid, gas producers sharing the same 
gas pipeline). Such information-sharing is essential for the proper functioning 
of the CI network.70
However, in some situations information-sharing can lessen competitive 
rivalry – for instance, in oligopolistic markets for homogeneous products. 
This is because competition in an oligopolistic industry depends on firms 
having some measure of uncertainty as to the actions of their competitors.  
 Information-sharing of this kind will not have the 
purpose, effect or likely effect of lessening competition. In network industries, 
co-operation may be necessary to facilitate competition and promote 
efficiency.  
A number of CI industries participating in the TISN share these 
characteristics. For example, within the Energy IAAG there are only a small 
number of natural gas producers and a small number of electricity generators. 
Moreover, within these Groups there might be concerns if firm specific 
transaction data for each competitor were to be disclosed to the other 
participants in the TISN; or if participants were to discuss future plans rather 
than disseminating data relating to past transactions.  
In other words, the use of a TISN to share confidential information which is 
not publicly available may remove some of the uncertainty that would 
otherwise prevail, leading to parallelism of prices and other terms and 
conditions of sale or product offerings. Whether this would be sufficient to 
                                                 
70 Dennis Carlton and J Klamer, ‘The Need for Coordination among Firms, with Special 
Reference to Network Industries’ (1983) 50 University of Chicago Law Review 446.  
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constitute a substantial lessening of competition would depend on the 
structure of the particular market. 
Sharing information about product characteristics can facilitate product 
standardisation. Product standardisation can be used to enable a competitor to 
ascertain the price of another competitor’s product. Information about the 
quality and contents of a competitor’s product allows an assessment of that 
competitor’s costs of production, and the price which that competitor is likely 
to charge in the market. Thus, while sharing product quality information poses 
less of a risk than sharing price information, it may have the effect or likely 
effect of  producing price uniformity, or less vigorous price competition.  
Section 45(2) of the TPA catches arrangements or understandings that have 
the effect or likely effect of substantially lessening competition.71
In this context the word ‘substantially’ does not set a very high threshold. In 
Rural Press Ltd v ACCC Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ (with whom 
Gleeson CJ and Callinan J agreed) stated that the word ‘substantial’ was used 
‘in the sense of being meaningful or relevant to the competitive process’.
 In other 
words, an arrangement or understanding between competitors whose purpose 
is completely innocent, such as mitigating the consequences of a terrorist 
attack, will nevertheless contravene section 45(2) if its likely effect is to 
substantially lessen competition.  
72
This then poses two questions: first, could a CIISS be an ‘arrangement or 
understanding’ within the meaning of section 45, and secondly, if so, could 
the operation of the CIISS be regarded as having the likely effect of 
substantially lessening competition? 
 
Competition is synonymous with independent rivalry or striving to produce 
the goods and services that are most highly valued by consumers at the lowest 
price and at the highest quality. This presupposes independent decision-
making as regards the price-quality-service package that is offered to 
consumers. The competitive process necessarily involves an element of 
uncertainty and risk, in part caused by limited information as to the 
capabilities, capacity, intentions and activities of competitors, customers, and 
suppliers. The sharing of this information pursuant to a CIISS may tend to 
lessen this uncertainty and have a chilling effect on competition in those 
markets where there is only a small number of competitors. 
                                                 
71 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 45(2)(a)(ii) and 45(2)(b)(ii). 
72 Rural Press Ltd v ACCC (2003) 216 CLR 53, 71. 
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Firms compete, not just on price, but in other dimensions as well, including 
the features of their products and the level of service they provide to their 
customers. In so far as information-sharing pursuant to a CIISS results in the 
disclosure of vulnerabilities and solutions it will result in uniformity across 
the sector, with some firms giving up their competitive advantages for the 
greater good of protecting national security. While this may be a laudable 
motive, it will not take the conduct outside the ambit of section 45(2). 
Exchanging information about product quality can lead to product 
standardisation which, in turn, can facilitate anti-competitive price uniformity 
where there are only a small number of competitors in a market.  
V INCREASED UNCERTAINTY: PROPOSED NEW MEASURE 
A proposed new measure canvassed by the Discussion Paper released on 8 
January 2009 by the Assistant Treasurer and Minister for Competition Policy 
and Consumer Affairs may, if it is adopted, increase the risk of contravening 
Divisions 1 and 2 of Part IV of the TPA and act as a further disincentive to 
participating in a CIISS.73
By way of background, the ACCC had in 2007 complained that the Federal 
Court’s interpretation of what constitutes an illegal ‘understanding’ for the 
purposes of section 45(2) has made it too difficult to prove that competitors 
have colluded. This led to its proposing a new way of approaching the term 
‘understanding’. 
  
In its Petrol Report,74
(a) The court may determine that a corporation has arrived at an 
understanding notwithstanding that: 
 the ACCC expressed the view that cases such as Leahy 
Petroleum have narrowed the scope of conduct caught by the term 
‘understanding’ as used in section 45(2) because of the need to prove a 
‘commitment’. The ACCC recommended that the TPA be amended to 
broaden and clarify the meaning of the term ‘understanding’. The ACCC 
recommended that consideration be given to amending the TPA to provide for 
an expanded definition of ‘understanding’ as follows: 
                                                 
73 Australian Government, The Treasury, Discussion Paper – Meaning of 'Understanding' in 
the Trade Practices Act 1974 <http://www.treasury.gov.au/contentitem.asp?NavId=037 
&ContentID=1459> . 
74 Australian Competition and Consumer Competition, Petrol prices and Australian consumers:  
Report of the ACCC inquiry into the price of unleaded petrol (December 2007) 
<http://www.accc.gov.au/content/item.phtml?itemId=806216&nodeId=d5fc6a56fb589b453ab
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(i) the understanding is ascertainable only by inference from any factual 
matters the court considers appropriate 
(ii) the corporation, or any other parties to the alleged understanding, 
are not committed to giving effect to the understanding. 
(b) The factual matters the court may consider in determining whether a 
corporation has arrived at an understanding include but are not limited to: 
(i) the conduct of the corporation or of any other person, including other 
parties to the alleged understanding 
(ii) the extent to which one party intentionally aroused in other parties 
an expectation that the first party would act in a particular way in 
relation to the subject of the alleged understanding 
(iii) the extent to which the corporation was acting in concert with 
others in relation to the subject matter of the alleged understanding 
(iv) any dealings between the corporation and any other parties to the 
alleged understanding before the time at which the understanding is 
alleged to have been arrived at 
(v) the provision by the corporation to a competitor, or the receipt by 
the corporation from a competitor, of information concerning the price 
at which or conditions on which, goods or services are supplied or 
acquired, or are to be supplied or acquired, by any of the parties to the 
alleged understanding or by any bodies corporate that are related to any 
of them, in competition with each other 
(vi) whether the information referred to in (v) above is also provided to 
the market generally at the same time 
(vii) the characteristics of the market 
(viii) the likelihood of the information referred to in (v) above being 
useful to the recipient of the information for any purpose other than 
fixing or maintaining prices; 
(ix) the extent to which, if at all, the communication referred to in (v) 
above was secret or intended by the parties to the communication to be 
secret.75
The ACCC proposal is designed to overcome the problem of proving the 
element of commitment when nothing has been reduced to writing. The 
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proposed new methodology would remove the need for any level of 
commitment, and clarify that a court may find that a corporation has arrived at 
an understanding by inference from the surrounding facts without the need for 
direct evidence. 
In his response to the ACCC reform proposal, the Assistant Treasurer and 
Minister for Competition Policy and Consumer Affairs, the Hon Chris Bowen 
MP, released the abovementioned Discussion Paper on the meaning of 
‘understanding’ in the TPA.76
If the Government were to adopt the ACCC’s recommendation this could act 
as a significant disincentive to private sector operators participating in the 
TISN. 
 
VI POSSIBLE APPROACHES FOR SHIELDING PRIVATE 
SECTOR PARTICIPANTS IN THE TISN 
Bearing in mind the manner in which the matters discussed above could 
impede the effective operation of a CIISS like the TISN, it is now appropriate 
to consider the possibility of some form of immunity for TISN related 
activities. 
There are three possible approaches by which immunity from contravening 
the TPA could be conferred on the private sector participants in the TISN:  
1. authorisation under the TPA;  
2. exemption conferred under special purpose Commonwealth 
legislation; and 
3. amendments to the TPA. 
A Authorisation 
The process of receiving authorisation under section 88 of the TPA is 
available to applicants so that they can obtain immunity and avoid 
contravening section 45(2). It is a protracted process that requires the 
applicant to specify in advance the conduct in question, and the public 
detriments (including any lessening of competition) likely to flow from it, as 
well as the public benefits.  
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The ACCC is then required to consult with industry. Once the ACCC has 
considered the application, it issues a draft determination and provides an 
opportunity for industry players to request a conference. Following any such 
conference, the ACCC will reconsider the application and issue its final 
determination. 
An authorisation will only confer immunity for the conduct as described in the 
application for authorisation. However, while reducing the risk of a terrorist 
attack would constitute a clear public benefit, the problem with the 
authorisation procedure is that a CIISS, like the TISN, is constantly evolving 
over time to deal with new threats as they emerge. The problems are 
prospective. Some may be hypothetical. They do not lend themselves to being 
described in advance.  
B Special Purpose Legislation 
A second mechanism for obtaining immunity and avoiding a contravention of 
the substantive prohibitions of the TPA is for the Commonwealth Parliament 
to pass separate legislation that grants an exemption. Section 51(1)(a) of the 
TPA provides that, in deciding whether a person has contravened Part IV, 
anything specified in and specifically authorised by any other Commonwealth 
Act (other than an Act relating to patents, trade marks, designs or copyright) 
or regulations made under such an Act, must be disregarded.  
Section 51(1)(a) is subject to the limitation in section 51(1C)(a) which 
provides that the authorising provision must specifically refer to the TPA. 
C Amendments to the TPA 
The third mechanism for removing liability under the TPA is to amend the 
TPA itself to provide for a specific defence for any person to any civil or 
criminal action brought under the TPA with respect to information-sharing 
under an IAAG or any plan of action relating to a terrorist threat or attack. 
The defence would be available provided the information-sharing was not 
undertaken for the purpose of contravening a competition provision of the 
TPA. 
VII CONCLUSION 
As stated earlier, there is broad agreement with regard to the strong policy 
against anti-competitive practices enshrined in Part IV of the TPA. However, 
it is also recognised that protecting competition must give way to other policy 
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objectives that have a more pressing claim, such as physical security from the 
threat of terrorist attack.  
The first challenge for a CIISS like the TISN is to get IAAG members to 
share information. If the arrangement is to operate effectively, private sector 
operators of critical infrastructure must be encouraged to share information 
about vulnerabilities, threats, intrusions and possible solutions amongst 
themselves in a full and frank manner – and also to share this information 
with the government, so that it can issue warnings and take appropriate action. 
It is difficult enough to get business entities to share such sensitive and 
confidential information in the normal course of things, without the added risk 
that doing so may involve a contravention of the TPA. 
In the United States, the Cyberspace Policy Review recognised that the 
existing public-private partnerships ‘... have fostered information sharing and 
served as a foundation for U.S. critical infrastructure protection and cyber-
security policy for over a decade.’77
The Cyberspace Policy Review recognised that federal laws in the United 
States, including the antitrust laws, were impeding full collaborative 
partnerships and information-sharing between the private sector and 
government. While recognising that ‘antitrust laws provide important 
safeguards against unfair competition’
 However, it also recognised that there is 
an urgent need to develop response and recovery plans and to conduct a 
national dialogue on cyber-security. The United States is already moving 
away from voluntary regulation to the adoption of mandatory standards in the 
energy and chemicals sectors. 
78 the report recognised the need for 
government to ‘... work creatively and collaboratively with the private sector 
to identify tailored solutions that take into account both the need to exchange 
information and protect public and private interests and take an integrated 
approach to national and economic security’.79
The existing TISN type of CIISS in Australia has been operating since 2003, 
with the participation of Commonwealth government agencies. At this stage it 
appears to be limited to Category 1 information disclosure. As yet there has 
been no application for authorisation under the TPA, and there has been no 
indication of any move towards enacting a specific exemption or statutory 
defence to protect the current TISN information-sharing arrangements. In fact, 
it has been reported officially that: 
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Advice to date is that general discussions within the TISN are not likely to 
raise issues relating to the competitiveness in the market place as they are 
generally in relation to security policies, threats and vulnerabilities. A 
similar view is taken of TISN meetings, at which government officials are 
present, as they are not a forum for detailed price and market information to 
be shared between competitors. Where representatives do wish to discuss 
information that could result in reaching some sort of agreement, it may be 
appropriate to seek authorisation from the Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission (ACCC). The Attorney-General’s Department has 
prepared a paper on this issue endorsed by the Chairman of the ACCC, Mr 
Graeme Samuel.80
Because of the secrecy surrounding TISN meetings it is not possible to 
ascertain how many private owners and operators of critical infrastructure 
participate in the information exchange; what kinds of officials represent the 
owners and operators at the meetings; what kinds of information are 
disclosed; or how extensive is the level of disclosure, especially in relation to 
breaches of cyber-security.  
 
Some kinds of Category 1 information-exchange (pertaining to risk 
minimisation prior to a terrorist attack) may have unintended anti-competitive 
consequences. For example, where private operators of CI compete with each 
other, the exchange of information about the reliability of their respective 
services, or vulnerability to attack could lessen competitive rivalry. While 
there may be no legal impediments to the exchange of security-related 
information, the exchange of commercially sensitive information and 
confidential know-how about how infrastructure and technology operates and 
how to make it more reliable, may have unintended anti-competitive 
consequences.  
Category 2 information-exchange (pertaining to incident response and 
recovery plans) involves a more serious risk of contravening Divisions 1 and 
2 of Part IV of the TPA. Where CIISS participants stop competing with each 
other to implement recovery plans, they are likely to agree to restrict supply to 
certain persons or classes of persons. In particular, whenever competitors 
come together for a joint project, for instance as a consortium to implement a 
recovery plan after a terrorist attack on CI, or for the purpose of deciding in 
advance which participants will be responsible for supplying particular 
geographical locations or particular customers, this conduct will be caught by 
section 44ZZRD (3)(a)(iii) and section 4D. 
The exchange of information concerning current and future production 
capacity can also lessen competition. Clearly, a firm’s estimate of its own 
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future capacity is likely to be modified in the light of what it learns of the 
plans of others. The exchange of such information thus preserves existing 
market shares, removes potential competition, and reduces the choice of 
sources of supply.  
The risk of contravening Divisions 1 and 2 of Part IV of the TPA is a legal 
impediment to private sector owners and operators of CI participating fully in 
TISN activities. The enactment of a special statutory defence under the TPA 
is necessary to shield these arrangements from competition law and would 
send a clear signal from the government that such information-sharing 
activities are not only permissible, but are to be actively encouraged.  
The Federal government in Australia needs to turn its mind to developing a 
solution for Australia similar to that adopted in the United States. 
